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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AFTER GLOBALIZATION BY
GAVIN W. ANDERSON (OXFORD & PORTLAND, OREGON:
HART PUBLISHING, 2005) 156 pages.'
BY DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN
2
Twenty years ago, the late Alan Freeman published a review
essay in the American Bar Foundation Research Journal (precursor to
Law and Social Inquiry) regarding a collection of papers edited by
David Sugarman.3 Freeman took the occasion to theorize linkages
between the left legal academic thought of the United Kingdom and the
critical legal studies movement in the United States. For almost ten
years, "critical legal thought [had] been threatening and destabilizing-
mainstream American legal thought,"4 wrote Freeman. First, there was
a "pre-Marxist period of eclectic disillusionment," which prompted a
wave of epistemological nihilism, followed by the "exhilarating"5
rediscovery of Marx, which precipitated, finally, a strategy of avoiding
the reduction of all to simple materialist analysis. Freeman described
this last phase as "postcritical neolegalist Marxism,"7 which he
associated with a move to legal pluralism in the United Kingdom: "The
classic response to reductionism is to substitute multiplicities for
singularities, to offer manyness instead of oneness, in short, to show that
the world is more complicated (or more contradictory) than one had
previously thought."'
The Sugarman book exemplified this desire to create a role for
law and legal institutions autonomous of the interests of the ruling class.
For Freeman, this sort of move was unsatisfactory, as it returned critical
'[Constitutional Rights].
2 Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Toronto, and Visiting Faculty,
Georgetown University Law Center.
I David Sugarman, ed., Legality, Ideology, and the State (London: Academic Press, 1983).
The review appears in Alan Freeman, "The Politics of Truth: On Sugarman's Legality, Ideology
and the State" (1986) Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 829 [Freeman, "Politics of Truth"].
4 Freeman, "Politics of Truth," ibid. at 831.
sIbid. at 834.
7 Ibid at 836.
8 Ibid. at 835.
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legal thought "right back to the 1950s where this story began." 9 It
amounted to embracing what he called "substantive pluralism" and
"British ... appropriation of American liberal pluralism."1 Brit-crits,
like their American cousins, Freeman concluded, were not "immune
from self-destructive and immobilizing moves.""
I trust that Gavin Anderson will forgive me for taking up valued
book review space with a discussion of another review of someone else's
book. He will, I am confident, appreciate somewhat the salience of
Freeman's review. First, Freeman makes the categorical error of tracing
the origins of British legal pluralist thought back to the American strand
of political pluralism associated with Robert Dahl and others.12 In fact,
the tradition of British political pluralist thought, associated with the
likes of Frederic Maitland, John Neville Figgis, and Harold Laski,
predates U.S. authorship by many decades and is also very unlike it. 3
Freeman fails to recognize the diversity of the sources of what we might
call constitutional knowledge-one of the principal lessons of
Anderson's book. Second, and more significantly, Freeman maintains
that pluralism is a dead-end-like much in critical legal studies, it is
"self-destructive and immobilizing." For Anderson, legal pluralism
offers up the obverse: an opportunity to re-engage with constitutional
law and theory on terms that provoke counter-hegemonic possibilities.
Rather than immobilizing, Anderson maintains, this form of critique is
liberating.4
Anderson's new book not only builds on this earlier pluralist
tradition, it is an important and critical intervention in its own right. Few
books aim to theorize linkages between constitutional law and economic
9 Ibid. at 839.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 See e.g. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961):
" See e.g. F.W. Maitland, "Moral Personality and Legal Personality" (1905) 6 J. Soc. Com.
Legis. 192; John Neville Figgis, Churches in the Modern State (London: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1913); and Harold J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1917). See generally David Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
4 
See also Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, "Introduction" in Wendy Brown & Janet Halley,
eds., Left Legalism/left Critique (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002).
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globalization, and so this book stands virtually alone in the field. 5 Law
and legal forms play a key role in the structuration of economic
globalization, from the facilitation of financial and currency transactions
to the enabling of private forms of transnational dispute resolution. It
might be assumed that constitutional law has little or no role to play in
the processes associated with economic globalization. Indeed, the
doniinant variant of "rights constitutionalism," associated with "liberal
legalism" (terms which Anderson commandeers), prefers to keep a
comfortable distance from relations of economic power. Yet, those who
promote economic globalization seek secure commitments from
national governments to eliminate local regulations that unduly
constrain the movement and operation of market actors. This can be
achieved via national legal reform, including constitutional reform, but
also via the embrace of transnational legal norms which prevail over
national legal norms. This is the constitutional and legal project
associated with economic globalization, that of limited government and
the subordination of politics to economics: in short, the ideology of neo-
liberalism. It is a matter of some urgency, then, that scholars take stock
of the ways in which law, and constitutional law in particular, is
implicated in the structuration of economic globalization. Anderson, to
his great credit, undertakes this very task.
Anderson's book rests on the claim that legal pluralism best aids
in comprehending law's role. A pluralistic lens, Anderson maintains,
"enables us to understand better, and respond to, the challenges facing
constitutionalism in an age of globalization." 6 The typical model of
rights constitutionalism associated with a liberal legal order is premised
upon a negative rights-based model enforced by judicial review, in which
all state action is suspect. This is the model at which Anderson takes
aim. If the state is not the exclusive source of law-making authority, as
pluralists maintain, then the dominant model-in which private actors,
'Among the few books that broach the subject are Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a
New Legal Common Sense. Law, Globalization, and Emancipation, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths
LexisNexis, 2002); Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2004); Heinz Kug, Constituting
Democracy. Globalism and South Africa's Political Reconstruction (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000); Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2003) c. 5; and David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalizatior
Investment Rules and Democracy's Promise [forthcoming].
16 Supra note 1 at 3.
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and multinational corporations in particular not only flex their
economic muscles through legal forms but are important sources for the
generation of legal norms-is sadly out of touch with current legal
processes. At bottom, Anderson's book is a call for an expanded
understanding of constitutionalism that captures not only public but also
so-called private exercises of political power.
Anderson's pluralist critique is structured on the distinction
between external and internal legal pluralism. From the outside,
external legal pluralism is capable of ascertaining a multiplicity of
sources of law-making authority. Drawing on Santos' social-theoretical
account of the constellations of structural power-which includes places
like the state, the household, the workplace, and the marketX18 -external
legal pluralism treats the state merely as one among a number of
sources of legal authority. From within, internal legal pluralism redraws
the portraits of sovereign legal orders so that they are made up of a
diversity of norms, some of which may be contradictory and which may
render the law incoherent. Anderson relies here on the work of
Sampford, who argued that the disorder of the law follows from a social
and legal "ml&e" that is precipitated by asymmetrical power relations
between conflicting groups and institutions. t9 Building on this argument
from incoherence, Anderson then takes aim at Dworkin's account of
"law as integrity,"2 which purports to draw correct answers to legal
questions from the available material. Testing Dworkin's thesis against
conflicting U.S. Fourteenth Amendment equality and Canadian
freedom of expression jurisprudence, Anderson concludes that
constitutional theory cannot provide judges with principled answers to
legal questions, nor are judges much interested in seeking guidance
from theory."1 Instead, judicial decision making under bills of rights is
better understood as the product of "the variety of real pressures and
'SSantos, supra note 15 at 371.
"9 Charles Sampford, The Disorder of Law: A Critique of Legal Theory (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1991) c. 6-7.
20Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).
21 For a frank admission from a judge that principled reasons often are not available, see
Richard A. Posner, "Foreword: A Political Court" (2005) 119 Harv. L. Rev. 32 at 40 ("[T]he
Supreme Court, when it is deciding constitutional cases, is political in the sense of having and
exercising discretionary power as capacious as a legislature's").
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motivations affecting judges, manifested in the form of asymmetrical
social and legal relations.,
23
If the external pluralist account is correct-that the social World
is made up of intersecting structural sources of normative authority-
then there is usually no direct correlation between legal victory and
social change. Yet, liberal legal theory assumes this correlation via the
medium of constitutional litigation. Wading into debates over the
instrumentality of constitutional litigation 24 (drawn from the realm of
U.S. First and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence), Anderson
concludes that an external legal pluralist account provides the best
explanation for the "inability of rights constitutionalism to secure its
own agenda."'
So far, there is little here to do with rights after globalization.
The external pluralist account looks very much like the one Freeman
described and critiqued in 1985, with its emphasis on multiplicity and
complexity in the place of unity and coherence. 26 The internal pluralist
story, with its emphasis on indeterminacy and the politics of judging,
looks even more remote from the traditional British pluralist account.
Indeed, Anderson's internalist account appears to close the gap between
the British and the U.S. critical legal perspectives identified by Freeman.
What, after all, is the difference between them in so far as they rely on
the "law is politics" and indeterminacy theses?27 Moreover, what does
21 Supra note 1 at 67. Anderson does not draw on the behaviouralist account of judging,
though he might have. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
24 See the debate between Gerald N. Rosenberg, "Positivism, Interpretivism, and the Study
of Law" (1996) 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry 435 and Michael. McCann, "Causal versus Constitutive
Explanations (or, On the Difficulty of Being so Positive)" (1996) 21 Law &. Soc. Inquiry 457. See
also, more generally, Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope. Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991); Michael McCann, Rights at Work. Pay Equity
Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994).
' Supra note 1 at 95.
2 Freeman, "Politics of Truth," supra note 3 at 838.
27 For a discussion of these and the critique of rights in the heyday of the Critical Legal
Studies movement, see Mark Tushnet, "Survey Article: Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers)
in the United States" (2005) 13 J. Pol. Phil. 99.
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this have to do with the capacity for constitutional law to engage
meaningfully with private power in the age of globalization?
Anderson begins to deliver on the book's promise in Part III
(chapters 6 and 7). First, he enters into the debate on the "politics of
constitutional definition." What qualifies as constitutional in an age of
economic globalization? According to the traditional account, only the
foundational rules authorized by national sovereign legal authorities
count as constitutional law. Other accounts, associated with a critique
known as "new constitutionalism," maintain that the rules and
structures of transnational legalism can be characterized as
constitutional for both descriptive and normative purposes.2" Anderson
sides with the new constitutionalist account. In order to develop the
argument, he first overcomes objections by Brian Tamanha and others
that legal pluralists have no satisfactory account of what law is.29 If all
social norms qualify, then the normative force of official law is diluted.
Transferred to the plane of constitutional law, the same objection is
made: if all law is constitutional, then no law is. For Anderson, the law's
provenance as "official" law, as Tamanha would have it, is not sufficient
to narrow the range of what qualifies as law. The question, instead, is
necessarily a political one "which can only be answered in relation to the
purposes served by attaching the label 'law' to some aspect of social
life."30 This is precisely why the debate over what gets defined as
constitutional is ultimately a political one.
According to the traditional account epitomized by the U.S. Bill
of Rights framework, private power may cloak itself in the mantle of
constitutional rights but, given the vicissitudes of state action doctrine,
will almost never be subjected to the disciplines imposed on public
authority by the constitution. In so far as this is the model that is being
promoted globally, then the politics of constitutional definition will limit
the capacity of citizens and states to countervail power in this age of
economic globalization. Applying, instead, the insights of legal pluralism
' See e.g. Harry W. Arthurs, "Governing the Canadian State: The Constitution in an Era
of Globalization, Neo-liberalism, Populism, Decentralization and Judicial Activism" (2003) 13
Const. Forum Const. 16; Stephen Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary
Neoliberalism" (1995) 24 Millenium: J. Int'l Stud. 399; and David Schneiderman, "Investment
Rules and the New Constitutionalism" (2002) 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 757.
29 Brian Z. Tamanha, "The Folly of the 'Social-Scientific' Concept of Legal Pluralism"
(1993) 20 J.L. & Soc'y 192.
3 0 Supra note 1 at 106.
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to the current situation brings the politics of definition to the fore. It
exposes the advancement of neo-liberal globalism via the medium of
legal rights and institutions which have the effect of separating and
shielding economic interests from political power. "The objective of the
new constitutionalism," Anderson writes, can then be seen as making
the constitutional dimension of neo-liberal globalization more explicit,
"with a view to engendering debate over whether it satisfies standards of
procedural or substantive constitutional legitimacy.",3' By redefining
what we mean by constitutionalism, we uncover the myriad sources of
oppression experienced by people in various locales and subject these
sources to the standards of social justice.
Yet, the disciplinary effects of the new constitutionalism place
limits not only on institutions but also on potential agents of change.
The new constitutionalist account, Anderson observes, takes legal
subjectivity seriously (just as critical legal pluralists would insist).32 If an
individual's legal experience is made up of multiple interactions, it is
also the case that, viewed in relational terms, the horizon of legal
experiences and expectations will be viewed as quite cramped. The
normativity of sovereignty-which competes with the pluralist and new
constitutionalist accounts-aims to maintain stability and hierarchy,
leading to social inertia. Taking a Gramscian turn, Anderson observes
that existing legal and normative structures, having attained the status of
common sense, constrain the capacity of agents to imagine alternative
futures by acting as boundary setters.
How then can "existing epistemological structures ... deliver any
meaningful counter-hegemonic engagement with private power[?]
3
This, Anderson maintains, is the central question for contemporary
constitutional theory. For reasons he outlines in the final chapter, any
reformulated version of liberal rights constitutionalism is "unlikely" to
offer up any counter-hegemonic narrative. This is because of "the
difficulty in practice of transcending the classical liberal default."34
Despite some advances in applying constitutional rights to private
31 Ibid. at 115.
32 See Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A. Macdonald, "What is Critical Legal
Pluralism?" (1997) 12 C.J.L.S. 25.
3 Supra note 1 at 35.
4Ibid. at 126.
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power, as in Shelley v. Kramer," concerning the enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants attached to land titles in the United States, the
presupposition of dominant liberal legalism is that "economic power
should not be subjected to the same direct constitutional scrutiny as
state power."36 There is an alternative model, prevalent in the European
tradition of constitutional law, which imposes positive obligations on the
state to protect fundamental rights even in the absence of state- action.
Constitutional obligations under this model may be imposed even on the
conduct of private actors.37 Though this goes substantially further than
the classical default requiring state action, there are limits to the
counter-hegemonic potential of this move. The model, Anderson notes,
does not direct how constitutional dilemmas are to be resolved. It does
not, in other words, provide correct answers to difficult constitutional
questions-a reiteration of the indeterminacy thesis. In addition-this
seemingly is the greatest flaw-the model relies on the state as the
"ultimate perpetrator of rights violations, given its responsibility for the
condition of the positive law."38 The model is organized around the idea
that there are matters that fall within the expected realm of state
responsibility, and then there are matters that fall beyond that realm-
many within the domain of the "private"-and thus beyond the scope of
constitutional rights. Both models fail Anderson's test of counter-
hegemonic constitutionalism: "that constitutional doctrine can be
remade to subject private power to constitutional scrutiny."39 The
dominant politics of constitutional definition insist on a divide between
the state and society which "serves the crucial legitimating function of
obscuring the broader constellation of law and political power-
including corporate law-making and corporate political power-
operating in society. '
None of this, Anderson insists, renders hegemonic
constitutionalism inevitable or irreversible. Rather, he claims that there
is at present a "paradigmatic movement to advance a new form of
3334 U.S. 1 (1948).
3 6 Supra note 1 at 135.
3 See Aharon Barak, "Constitutional Rights and Private Law" (1996) 3 Rev. Const. Stud.
218.
I Supra note 1 at 142.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. at 143.
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constitutional knowledge" associated with the constitutional politics of
definition. A legal pluralist constitutionalism assists in understanding
this conjuncture as it opens up to constitutional interrogation all sources
of power, public and private, irrespective of its provenance. Yet it does
not mean supplanting one constitutional definition for another; rather,
it suggests making the politics of definition "a constant feature of
debate,"41 thereby continuously diversifying the sources of constitutional
knowledge.
Given the prevalence of the dominant paradigm in
constitutional epistemology, this suggestion is a radical and unsettling
prescription, and also, for reasons outlined in the book, one unlikely to
take hold any time soon. Nevertheless, Anderson remains hopeful,
pointing to social movement actors as catalysts for resistance to the
Washington consensus. In this regard, the oft-mentioned "water wars"
in Cochabamba, Bolivia, are conscripted into the argument. There, in
Bolivia's third largest municipality, water rates almost doubled after
privatization of the city's water supplies under a concession granted to
Aguas del Tunari (a subsidiary of San Francisco-based Bechtel
Enterprises). This prompted a city-wide campaign to reverse the
privatization plan and the declaration of a state of emergency. When
hundreds were injured, six died, and company executives fled from
Bolivia, the water wars became a cause cdilbre for the anti-capitalist
-globalization movement and provoked Anderson's interest in the case.
42
There is more to the story, however. After the government terminated
its concession with Aguas del Tunari, the company sought to recoup
damages in the amount of twenty-five million U.S. dollars from the
Bolivian government under a Holland-Bolivia bilateral investment
treaty on the basis that there was a compensable taking of the
company's investment interest. There was some question whether Aguas
del Tunari was permitted to sue under the Dutch treaty (having been
incorporated initially in the Cayman Islands), but an international
investment tribunal, which was established under the auspices of the
41 Ibid. at 148.
42 See Oscar Olivera with the collaboration of Tom Lewis, eds., i Cochabamba! Water War
in Bolivia (Cambridge: South End Press, 2005). I have succumbed to the allure of this story of
resistance. See David Schneiderman, "Globalisation, Governance and Investment Rules" in John
N. Clarke & Geoffrey R. Edwards, eds., Global Governance in the. Twenty First Century (London:
Palgrave, 2004) 67 [Schneiderman, "Globalisation"].
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International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
at the World Bank, resolved that it had jurisdiction.43 I have suggested
elsewhere that the terms of the bilateral investment treaty likely
favoured the company's claim, however meritorious the movement to
cancel the privatization contract. 44 Most interesting about this postscript,
and from which Anderson might draw some instruction, is that Aguas
del Tunari ultimately withdrew its claims for damages. This likely
occurred as a result of an effective social movement campaign to
pressure the parent company, Bechtel, and its chairman and CEO, Riley
Bechtel, to withdraw the claim.4 ' Here is an instance where counter-
hegemonic mobilization at the local level precipitated the cancellation
of a seemingly irreversible water privatization scheme, and where a
transnational network of social movement actors, primarily but not
exclusively based in the United States, helped to secure the withdrawal
of a claim for damages that otherwise was likely to succeed. It may be a
precedent, however, difficult to build upon. Other company claimants
may not feel they need to fold, while the transnational network
mobilized to take on Bechtel might not have the capacity to take on the
hundred or so cases pending before ICSID. What likely will endure, at
least into the medium term, is the web of international investment
treaties that entitle foreign investors to virtually guaranteed rates of
return on their investments. It is this regime of hard, constitution-like
law that likely will thwart social movement actors from achieving more
lasting alterations to the new constitutional order. Anderson's
prognosis, for this reason, is not far off the mark.
4 Aguas del Tunan, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, (2006) 20 ICSID Rev. 450 (International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes).
' See Schneiderman, "Globalisation," supra note 42 at 78-81.
4See Jim Shultz, "Bechtel vs. the Bolivia: The People Win!!" The Democracy Center On-
Line (19 January 2006), online: The Democracy Center On-Line <http://democracyctr.org/
newsletter/vo169.htm>.
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